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Ekvidu is designed so identity, tenant data, provider execution and operator access remain separate, least-privileged surfaces with auditable transitions.
Security is a chain of boundaries, not a badge. Each stage below has a different owner, failure mode and acceptance test.
Keep account entry provider-neutral, state-checked and session-managed without returning identity-provider secrets to the browser.
Authorise every protected read and write against the organisation and resource, not sign-in alone.
Keep provider output untrusted and isolate future provider and arbitrary-URL work from the customer application.
Protect customer evidence with scoped access, encrypted storage and retention rules that can be inspected and tested.
Prove backup, restore, key rotation, incident response and time-bounded support access before a wider beta.
The sections below keep present foundations and future gates visible together. They are a reviewable product boundary, not a certification statement.
The current application uses provider-neutral account entry, server-managed opaque sessions and request-integrity protections. Existing protected resources are designed around organisation and resource ownership, while browser-facing auth failures remain bounded and avoid returning provider secrets.
Production beta requires isolated provider and arbitrary-URL workers, encrypted external evidence storage, tested deletion and backup expiry, independently verified restore and rollback, monitored cost kill switches, MFA and device-session journeys, and audited time-bounded support access.
Architecture and tests are evidence for specific controls, not proof of universal security. A formal security contact, disclosure process, subprocessor list and customer security documents remain pre-launch owner and legal gates.
The private build can describe specific controls and tests. It cannot turn those descriptions into a universal security claim.
Read the privacy draft with the same care: intended processing, current retention gaps and the operations that still need proof.